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INTRODUCTION
Email has replaced the letter as the main written 
communications medium, both in business and 
personal life. It is estimated that the average 
employee spends a quarter of their time on 
email-related tasks and the average number of 
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ABSTRACT
The	continued	reliance	on	email	communications	ensures	that	it	remains	a	major	source	of	evidence	during	a	
digital	investigation.	Emails	comprise	both	structured	and	unstructured	data.	Structured	data	provides	qualita-
tive	information	to	the	forensics	examiner	and	is	typically	viewed	through	existing	tools.	Unstructured	data	is	
more	complex	as	it	comprises	information	associated	with	social	networks,	such	as	relationships	within	the	
network,	identification	of	key	actors	and	power	relations,	and	there	are	currently	no	standardised	tools	for	
its	forensic	analysis.	This	paper	posits	a	framework	for	the	forensic	investigation	of	email	data.	In	particular,	
it	focuses	on	the	triage	and	analysis	of	unstructured	data	to	identify	key	actors	and	relationships	within	an	
email	network.	This	paper	demonstrates	the	applicability	of	the	approach	by	applying	relevant	stages	of	the	
framework	to	the	Enron	email	corpus.	The	paper	illustrates	the	advantage	of	triaging	this	data	to	identify	(and	
discount)	actors	and	potential	sources	of	further	evidence.	It	then	applies	social	network	analysis	techniques	
to	key	actors	within	the	data	set.	This	paper	posits	that	visualisation	of	unstructured	data	can	greatly	aid	the	
examiner	in	their	analysis	of	evidence	discovered	during	an	investigation.
emails sent by a corporate user per day is 43 
(Orloff, 2011). Email can therefore provide 
the investigator with a wealth of information 
through both structured and unstructured 
data. Emails are structured in that they are 
formatted according to RFCs 5321 and 5322 
(Klensin, 2008a, 2008b). However, they also 
provide unstructured information through the 
communications links and contacts that form 
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social networks. Digital forensics software, such 
as EnCase (Guidance, 2011) or the Forensics 
Toolkit (FTK) (Access, 2011), are useful for 
analysing structured data, i.e., the content of the 
emails in their textual form. However, they do not 
elucidate the unstructured data, such as relation-
ships within the email network, power relations 
or network bridges that may be a key concern to 
a forensics investigation. Social network analysis 
and visualisation techniques can significantly 
contribute to evidence discovery and collection 
by identifying and understanding relationships 
and data flow between actors. Moreover, it may 
be used to quickly identify key events of interest 
within the email social network.
A number of challenges exist to today’s 
digital forensics investigations involving email. 
As with many forensic investigations, cases 
routinely involve more than one computer 
(Richard & Roussev, 2006) and the investiga-
tor is unlikely to have access to all computers 
involved in the email network. Digital forensics 
investigatory models do not currently differenti-
ate between email and any other data. Current 
work on digital investigations involving email 
data focus on techniques for the extraction of 
evidence, for example, data mining (Wei et 
al., 2008) or clustering algorithms (Bird et al., 
2006). Recently there has been some focus on 
process models for investigations that involve 
email data. These approaches generally provide 
a theoretical framework or software application, 
which detail techniques for the visualisation 
and extraction of specific email artefacts or 
features. However, this research focuses on 
particular aspects of email data rather than the 
wider process. Finally, much of the evidence 
that is recovered during an investigation may 
not be analyzed beyond the structured data 
view. For example, an examiner will manually 
trawl through the emails relating to an activity 
under scrutiny to search for those relevant to 
the investigation. However, they rarely explore 
the relevant social relationships and networks 
that these, and other network communications 
such as ‘chat’ sessions, will reveal due to the 
lack of facility in the tools they have at their 
disposal. These social networks are potentially 
great sources of interest as they may lead the in-
vestigator to other relevant sources of evidence, 
actors related by events or power relationships 
that are relevant to an investigation.
This paper presents a novel framework for 
the forensic investigation of unstructured email 
data. This framework follows traditional digital 
forensics procedures but incorporates tools and 
techniques for the triage and analysis of emails. 
This is achieved by using social network analy-
sis and data visualisation to identify relevant 
evidence from unstructured data. This paper 
is organised as follows. In the next section we 
discuss relevant literature in the areas of social 
networks and email analysis. Following this, 
the novel framework is posited. In order to 
demonstrate the applicability of the approach, 
relevant stages are applied to the Enron email 
corpus as a case study. Finally, we make our 
conclusions and discuss further work.
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
AND EMAIL INVESTIGATIONS
Investigations involving social networks have 
raised in prominence due to the reliance of 
users on their digital communications and the 
information about a suspect these data sources 
may yield to the forensic examiner. Computer 
forensics tools, such as EnCase (Guidance, 
2011) and FTK (Access, 2011), are used by 
examiners to recreate files and data from a 
suspect’s computer. However, these tools are 
designed to analyse structured data rather than 
elucidate unstructured data that is present in 
communications. Moreover, these tools do not 
provide a visualization of evidence or quantify 
the importance of actors within a social network.
There are various representations of social 
networks in the digital world, of which email 
is just one. Other social network representa-
tions include friends on Facebook, followers 
of a Twitter account or a contacts list within 
a mobile phone, each with different levels of 
information that they may provide to the exam-
iner. Our reliance on email within the business 
environment provides the investigator with an 
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entropic representation of the suspect’s social 
networks through qualitative and quantitative 
information derived from both structured and 
unstructured data.
A social network is an interconnected 
group or system and the relations, both logical 
and physical, between the actors. Wasserman 
and Faust (1994) suggest that the presence of 
relational information is a critical and defining 
feature of a social network. There is a tendency 
to assume that just because actors are linked 
they must form a cohesive social network. 
However, this is not necessarily the case and 
the relationships between network members 
must be explored to fully understand how these 
networks function. Therefore, when investi-
gating social networks, we must account for 
unstructured data as this will help us understand 
the network dynamics.
The interaction and dynamics of social 
networks has for a long time been of interest 
in inter-disciplinary research, and in particular, 
the social sciences. For example, Granovetter 
(1973) highlights the strength of weak ties in 
which these relationships provide new and bet-
ter opportunities by providing bridges between 
loosely interconnected groups. Freeman (1978) 
suggests that analysing centrality measures 
within social networks may provide social sci-
ence researchers with an understanding of the 
dynamics of those groups under investigation. 
In a digital forensics investigation, centrality 
may provide the examiner with an understand-
ing of the levels of culpability within an act 
involving a group of people (Haggerty et al., 
2008). Lawler and Yoon (1996) focus on com-
mitment and power in exchange relationships. 
This research attempts to predict how and when 
people in an exchange become committed to 
their relationship. Therefore, there is a rich 
literature from which other disciplines may 
learn and incorporate into their own research.
Current tools for social network analysis 
often require users to write scripts which are 
interpreted by the software to present the 
network visually. Applications such as Pajek 
(Vlado, 2011) or SocNetV (Kalamaras, 2011) 
visualise network information via the connec-
tion of vertices through arcs and edges. Once 
produced, the network and the relationships 
between actors may be explored. These ap-
plications provide various tools for measuring 
networks. For example, SocNetV provides a 
number of measures and layouts for analysing 
actors’ power and centrality within the network 
based on graph theory. In addition, weighting 
may be applied to network edges to represent 
strength of ties. The use of weighting (for 
example by value or frequency) provides a 
deeper analysis of network dynamics (Perer & 
Schneiderman, 2009). Due to scalability issues 
in these visualisations where large graphs, such 
as those identified through email, soon become 
counter-intuitive, other approaches to network 
visualisations have been proposed. For example, 
Lee et	al. (2006) propose TreePlus, a tree layout 
approach to explore social networks. These trees 
can be expanded or reduced to provide a more 
intuitive view of larger networks. Falkowski 
et	al. (2006) suggest an approach for analysis 
of subgroup evolution in social networks. This 
approach uses a number of views to facilitate 
analysis, and displays the network in a graph 
but organised along a temporal plain. Hu and 
Gong (2010) present a visualisation of individu-
als’ spatial-temporal social networks through 
three-dimensional graphs. Snasel et	al. (2009) 
propose the use of Galois lattices for social 
network analysis in a small-scale network 
comprising 18 actors over 14 social events.
Despite issues of scalability in current tools, 
social network analysis has been proposed as an 
area that would benefit digital investigations. 
For example, Wang and Daniels (2008) suggest 
a graph-based approach to aid the investigation 
of network attacks. These approaches may also 
be used for data held in email applications. 
For example, Haggerty et	al. (2009) proposed 
the Email Extraction Tool (EET) for the auto-
mated extraction and visualisation of email data 
resident in files on the hard drive. Dellutri et	
al. (2009) focus on the identification of social 
networks through data on smartphones and Web 
information. This approach aims to reconstruct 
a user’s profile by combining the smartphone’s 
data with social relationships found on the 
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Internet. Wiil et	al. (2010) provide an analysis 
of the 9/11 hijackers’ network and focus on the 
relationships between these actors. This study 
uses a number of measures associated with social 
network analysis to identify key nodes. Wei et	
al. (2008) suggest a data mining approach to 
detect email spam. Whilst this approach does not 
visualise data, it does use techniques associated 
with this type of approach. Kim (2007) takes this 
further by incorporating visualisation of data 
to distinguish between ‘spam’ and legitimate 
emails. However, this approach does not iden-
tify the activities and relationships of a suspect 
under investigation. Henseler (2010) suggests 
an approach for filtering large email collections 
during an investigation based on statistical and 
visualisation techniques. This method uses the 
Enron email corpus as the basis for its results. 
Hadjidj et	al. (2009) propose a forensic email 
analysis framework based on an automated 
tool which utilises statistical and machine-
learning techniques.
These approaches have in common that they 
focus on the details of extracting and identifying 
data within specific environments to identify 
the social network rather than developing robust 
procedures for the analysis of unstructured data. 
The next section proposes such a framework.
INVESTIGATION FRAMEWORK
This section presents a framework for use in 
the investigation of email data. In particular, 
this approach focuses on incorporating social 
network analysis techniques into digital fo-
rensics investigations to elucidate structured 
and unstructured data. In this way, key pieces 
of information and evidence sources beyond 
the computer which holds the data may 
be identified.
Social network analysis assumes that in-
terpersonal ties between actors are important 
as they transmit behaviour, attitudes, informa-
tion, goods and services (de Nooy et al., 2005). 
Within a digital forensics investigation, this is 
reflected in the unstructured data. As Viegas et 
al. (2004) posit, email and instant messaging 
capture some of the most meaningful social 
interactions that people have online every 
day with people participating in a variety of 
social groups.
Often, people will reflect their social groups 
in their organization of their email accounts by 
moving individual messages from their inbox 
into folders. For example, in a work-based 
email account folders may be organized by the 
various roles they perform within the organiza-
tion, administration information and personal 
or professional contacts. Within a home-user 
account folders may be organized by family, 
friends, hobbies and interests or social activities. 
Therefore, folder organization will provide the 
forensics examiner with a rudimentary indica-
tion of the suspect’s view of their wider social 
networks. However, of further interest during 
an investigation includes:
• How are these social networks organized?
• Who are the key actors within these 
networks?
• What is the role of the suspect within these 
networks?
• What roles do the other actors play within 
the network?
• What are the strong ties within these net-
works (i.e., who are the core of actors with 
whom the suspect regularly corresponds)?
• What is the relationship between the suspect 
and other actors in the network?
• Are there specific individuals that bridge 
disparate clusters of actors?
• Can other potential sources of evidence be 
identified through the email flow?
As discussed earlier, the forensic examiner 
will be faced with analyzing both structured 
and unstructured data during the course of an 
investigation. The approach for visualizing 
unstructured data posited in this paper may not 
provide evidence per	se, but it provides a power-
ful analysis technique particularly where groups 
of suspects are involved, such as paedophile 
rings, terrorist networks or organized crime. 
This approach highlights roles and actors within 
International Journal of Digital Crime and Forensics, 3(3), 1-18, July-September 2011   5
Copyright © 2011, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
these networks, their level of involvement, their 
centrality to the investigation and provides clues 
for the examiner as to other potential sources 
of evidence or suspects.
Figure 1 illustrates the framework for the 
investigation of email data. These processes 
do not differ much from any other investiga-
tion. However, the Triage and Analysis stages 
reflect the need to identify and assess relational 
information from the unstructured data. This is 
achieved through the use of software specifi-
cally aimed at this type of analysis.
As with any investigation, the data must 
be acquired in a robust manner, ensuring that 
the evidence maintains its integrity. Therefore, 
data is imported from the hard drive storage 
located on an image of the original hard drive. 
This is done as ‘read only’ to ensure that the 
data to be analysed is not modified. Email cli-
ent files are located in software-specific direc-
tories. For example, Mozilla Thunderbird stores 
email data in text format in the following di-
rectories dependent on the operating system: 
C:\Documents and Settings\[UserName]\Ap-
plicationData\Thunderbird\ Profiles\ (XP), C:\
users\[User Name]\AppData\Roaming\Thun-
derbird\Profiles\ (Vista), ~/.thunderbird/
xxxxxxxx.default/ (Linux) and ~/Library/
Thunderbird/Profiles/ xxxxxxxx.default/ (Mac 
OS X) (Haggerty et al., 2009).
Data is imported from the email client di-
rectories as discussed above. Email, especially 
in the Windows environment, can be problem-
atic to the investigator due to the number of 
formats and conventions available. Mozilla 
Thunderbird emails are the less problematic 
as they are stored in text format so there is less 
work to do in parsing the information. Email 
clients such as Microsoft Outlook are more 
problematic as the data is stored in a bespoke 
format. However, if emails are in the more 
complex Outlook PST file format, they can be 
converted to the Thunderbird, i.e., text, format 
using tools such as libPST.
Data is triaged using the Email Extrac-
tion Tool (EET) (Haggerty et al., 2009). This 
software automatically reads the data in the 
operating system location for the email client 
to perform a number of functions. The EET 
approach sets out to provide an initial view of 
two dimensions of email patterns; the social 
networks to which a suspect belongs (link 
analysis) and the strength of ties between 
actors within that network (identify actors of 
interest to the investigation team). This method 
differs from current approaches in that it does 
not focus on the textual context of individual 
emails. It should be noted that this view of the 
network is a suspect-centric snapshot, i.e., as 
we are analyzing the suspect’s computer, the 
Figure	1.	Overview	of	the	framework	for	the	investigation	of	email	data
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social network links will be from the suspect’s 
point of view. An initial view of the suspect’s 
strength of ties, indicated by quantitative, 
events-based analysis of key actors’ commu-
nications, can provide an initial understanding 
of the wider social networks and the power or 
centrality within those networks. In order to 
achieve this, the social patterns derived from 
the FROM, TO, and CC data in both messages 
sent to and received by the suspect are used. 
In addition, by mining the email applications 
associated files for this events-based informa-
tion, EET allows for the hidden e-mail problem 
identified in Carenini et al. (2005) and is taken 
into account in the visualization of the social 
network. In effect, messages in email chains 
are treated as individual emails and explored 
for social network information. The Triage 
stage enables the investigator to gain an initial 
impression of the social networks evident in 
the suspect’s emails and to identify key actors 
or further sources of evidence. In addition, it 
processes the data for output into other social 
network analysis tools, such as Pajek.
Analysis extends the findings of the tri-
aged data to examine both the structured and 
unstructured data. The structured data refers 
to the email textual information, for example, 
header information and the email contents. Ex-
isting tools, such as FTK and EnCase provide 
the facility to read this data in a forensically 
sound manner. Depending on the quantity of 
emails recovered, this may be a time-consuming 
process. However, investigators can use the 
results of the triage stage to identify only those 
emails relevant to the investigation, thereby 
reducing this time considerably. Unstructured 
data analysis refers to the examination of the 
emails for relational information. The use of 
social network analysis tools, such as Pajek or 
SocNetV, enable the examiner to quantify the 
relationships identified in the email data by 
using statistical and mathematical techniques 
to provide different viewpoints of the network. 
Quantifying the relationships enables the inves-
tigator to identify the role that actors within the 
network fulfil in relation to the event(s) under 
investigation, particularly to identify culpability 
(Haggerty et al., 2008) or potential sources of 
further evidence.
Unstructured data may be analysed in a 
number of ways using existing social network 
analysis techniques to quantify relational data. 
Tools, such as SocNetV, apply graph theory 
to the network data and enable the investiga-
tor to measure and visualise the network in 
a variety of ways. A combination of various 
measures provides an overview of the dynam-
ics of the network from different viewpoints 
and an appreciation of the actors’ or groups’ 
roles therein. Out-degree	centrality measures 
the expansiveness, or number, of actors that 
a particular actor possesses or accesses. It 
therefore measures which actors provide the 
most potential connections within the network. 
In-degree	centrality is the inverse of out-degree 
centrality to indicate a node’s receptivity or 
“popularity” in the network and can be used to 
identify key network facilitators. Betweeness	
centrality identifies potential points of control 
within the network. Those that act as choke-
points (are the most between others) may be 
centres of power, control and influence because 
they can choose to retain or share information 
with other actors in the network. Betweeness 
recognises that communication flow within a 
given network often does not rely on adjacent 
actors but moves along geodesics. Because they 
are focal points of communications within the 
group and subgroups, certain actors facilitate 
contact and communications within the network 
and can therefore be seen as major channels of 
influence. For further details on quantitative 
analysis of social networks and the details of 
these measures, see Freeman (1978) and Was-
serman and Faust (1994).
The final stage of the framework is the 
presentation of evidence. The visualisations 
of data produced in the previous two stages 
are a key part of the presentation as they can 
be used to elucidate any wider results obtained 
during the investigation. These visualisations 
will be supported by evidence obtained through 
structured data analysis.
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CASE STUDY AND RESULTS
This section demonstrates the applicability of 
the framework, as detailed in the previous sec-
tion, by applying it to the Enron email corpus. 
The aim of this case study is not to provide a 
full analysis of this data set, but to illustrate 
the process of investigating unstructured 
email data. The Enron email corpus contains 
data from approximately 500,000 emails, the 
accounts of which were predominantly senior 
management at the company. This data has 
been released by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Committee (FERC) and is sanitised for 
use in research (Cohen, 2009). The data set 
provides real data from a large-scale fraud that 
can be used for research in a number of ways. 
For example, Lin (2010) uses this data set to 
demonstrate the applicability of their approach 
in predicting sensitive relationships identified 
in email communications. Alternatively, Zhou 
et	al. (2010) use this data set for text analysis 
which employs a wide variety of statistical 
techniques to identify value profiles of Enron 
employees. Alternatively, Collingsworth et	al. 
(2009) use network analysis of this data set to 
assess organisational stability. Therefore, this 
data set provides a means by which the email 
analysis framework may be tested.
Background to the Enron Fraud
Enron was a large energy company that had 
expanded from its beginnings in 1985 to employ 
thousands of workers across 40 countries. The 
Enron fraud caused shockwaves within the 
business community when it was revealed in 
2001 due to the extent and scale of the case. 
The fraud resulted in the bankruptcy of the 
company and dissolution of a large accoun-
tancy and audit company. The fraud occurred 
due to the lack of transparency in the firm’s 
accountancy procedures. The main executives 
in the company used a series of techniques 
to perpetrate the fraud, such as accountancy 
loopholes, employing special purpose entities 
and poor accountancy practices, in order to hide 
billions of dollars of debt that the company had 
accrued. For a detailed report of the investiga-
tion, see Powers et al. (2002).
The main actors in the Enron fraud are 
as follows:
• Jeffrey Skilling: former president of Enron 
Corporation; Chief Operating Officer from 
1999; responsible for Enron’s move into 
energy wholesale and Internet trading; 
introduced accounting methods that treated 
anticipated profits as if they were real gains. 
He was convicted of multiple federal felony 
charges (conspiracy, securities fraud, false 
statement and insider trading) in 2006.
• Kenneth Lay: Enron Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) except for the 
months of Skilling’s tenure from 1985. He 
was found guilty of ten counts of securities 
fraud but died before sentencing.
• Andrew Fastow: Chief Financial Officer; 
set up a network of off-balance-sheet com-
panies controlled by Enron to hide Enron 
losses. He received a six-year sentence 
on charges of conspiracy, insider trading, 
money laundering, and wire and securi-
ties fraud.
• Jeffrey McMahon and Ben Glisan: former 
Enron treasurers executives; chiefly re-
sponsible for brokering the relationships 
and financial dealing between Enron and 
its strategic partnerships.
• Ken Rice: former Enron executive and 
president of Enron’s broadband service, 
found guilty of over 15 counts of securi-
ties fraud.
• Sherron Watkins: considered as a whistle-
blower of the Enron fraud. She wrote a 
concerned email to Kenneth Lay warning 
of financial statements irregularities.
The Enron fraud ran over a number of 
years before being discovered in 2002. Due to 
the complexity of the case, it took another four 
years until conviction of the main protagonists. 
The timeline of key events are shown in Table 1.
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Acquisition and Importation
In a digital investigation, images will be taken 
of all hard drives and the data will be analysed 
in a robust manner following well described 
procedures. These hard drive images will contain 
the email files and the email client preferred by 
the user. The Enron corpus is available both in 
mbox and PST formats online. Due to the quantity 
of email data available in the Enron corpus, this 
paper will concentrate on two of the main actors 
in the fraud, Jeffrey Skilling and Andrew Fastow, 
to demonstrate the applicability of the approach. 
This reflects many digital forensics investigations 
where one or two suspects will form the starting 
point for an examiner. Moreover, it will apply 
their data to the two stages in the framework 
related to the analysis of unstructured data; triage 
and relational analysis.
Triage
As discussed above, the Triage stage aims to 
identify important links between the suspect 
and other actors in the network or to discount 
actors from the investigation. In this way, the 
number of actors and emails requiring analysis 
may be reduced considerably. The EET tool has 
a number of network views to aid the examiner 
in this task and it is outside the scope of this 
paper to discuss them here. However, more 
details of the software, including the different 
network views that it affords to aid analysis are 
detailed in Haggerty et al. (2009).
Figure 2 illustrates Jeffrey Skilling’s “dis-
cussion threads” emails organised using EET’s 
‘Clever Circular’ layout. This layout organises 
actors in a circle, with actors with stronger 
links in the network laid out horizontally in the 
Table	1.	Timeline	of	key	events	in	the	Enron	fraud	
Year Key events
1999 Board of Directors allows Andrew Fastow to run private business partnerships to purchase poorly 
performing Enron assets. Andrew Fastow creates LJM and Chewco for this purpose. These are later 
found to have been created to disguise Enron debt and inflate profits.
2000 Enron implicated as a major culprit in the California energy shortage.
2001 February - Jeffrey Skilling named CEO of Enron. 
August – Jeffrey Skilling resigns as CEO of Enron, stating he needed more time with his family. 
Kenneth Lay returns from retirement to become CEO of Enron. 
Enron reports losses of $618 million. Sherron Watkins expresses concerns over Enron business prac-
tices. Enron publicly discloses an open inquiry by the Securities and Exchange Commission into the 
limited partnerships between Enron and the companies Chewco and LJM owned by Andrew Fastow. 
Andrew Fastow is ousted from his position at Enron. Enron releases information that it has over-
stated profits by an amount of $586 million dollars. 
Enron files for bankruptcy protection.
2002 Investigations into Enron’s financial dealings begin. 
Kenneth Lay resigns as CEO of Enron stating too much of his time would be taken up with investi-
gations. 
An Enron board report concludes that Enron executives intentionally manipulated company profits. 
Andrew Fastow arrested on charges of fraud and money laundering.
2003 Eleven Enron executives indicted. 
Ben Glisan pleads guilty to fraud.
2004 Andrew Fastow pleads guilty to two counts of conspiracy and receives a lesser sentence for turning 
state’s evidence. 
Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay indicted on counts of wire fraud, securities fraud, insider trading 
and conspiracy.
2006 Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling convicted of multiple counts of fraud and conspiracy. Both men 
receive heavy jail sentences.
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centre of the circle. Node sizing is by sender. 
Edge labels comprise the subject line of the 
email(s) sent between the actors. This particular 
network contains 653 emails with 1148 actors. 
The data is filtered to select only those emails 
that contained in-depth discussions between 
Jeffrey Skilling and members of Enron corpo-
rate body and discussions with others external 
to the company.
In Figure 2, we see Jeffrey Skilling (actor 
5) receding into the noise of the network. Five 
actors appear significant in this view, one of 
whom (actor 6) may be identified as a poten-
tial source of further evidence due to her 
prominence in this network view and as her 
company role as Skilling’s Personal Assistant 
(PA). The PA will naturally be prominent in 
the social network featuring the main actor as 
the position naturally bridges many network 
groups within the organisation.
Another significant actor identified in this 
view (actor 1) represents a member of Skill-
ing’s family, a fellow Enron employee. The 
edge labels suggest that these emails represent 
personal jokes and other topics not relevant to 
the investigation. This actor stands out because 
of the sheer volume of traffic, as the emails are 
sent to many other actors within the network 
as well as to Skilling.
Actors 2, 3 and 4, are highlighted as sig-
nificant on this view. Actors 2 and 3 represent 
members of networks that are external to the 
Enron corporate structure. Email headers sug-
gest that these are exclusive “insider” networks 
comprising relationships formed outside of the 
Enron structure. These relate to fraternity mem-
bership and relationships formed by network 
members at college.
The final significant actor (actor 4) rep-
resents another network bridge. This actor 
(Leonardo Pacheco) bridges the relationship 
and networks between the current CEO, Jef-
frey Skilling, and former CEO, Kenneth Lay. 
Historical documents detailing the downfall 
Figure	2.	Jeffrey	Skilling	Inbox	“discussion	threads”	view	by	senders
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of Enron show that this actor was a confidante 
of Kenneth Lay and disseminator of financial 
information around the greater Enron com-
pany network. Given this information and the 
actor’s significant position in the network it 
would be natural to assume some knowledge 
of the fraudulent activities of other members. 
However, although this actor received higher 
than usual bonuses from Enron, he was not 
implicated in the Enron fraud.
Figure 3 illustrates Andrew Fastow’s email 
networks consisting of 188 emails with 215 
unique actors. This data comprises four differ-
ent sources within the Enron data set as many 
of his contacts were external to the company 
and therefore not included in the email corpus.
Ten main actors can be identified from this 
view. These actors have been teased out of the 
main body to give a better impression of how 
the e-mails are linked and of how information 
flows around this network group. Node sizing 
ALL, i.e., both senders and receivers, was used 
to gain an overall impression of the importance 
of the main actors within this network. From 
this view we can see some familiar actors, such 
as Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, PAs Rosalee 
Fleming and Sheri Serra, and some new actors, 
Ken Rice, Jeffrey McMahon and Ben Glisan. 
The email headers suggest that this set of actors 
and the context of the data set relate to finance. 
Indeed, all of the actors except the PAs have 
corporate positions congruous to this.
Actors 1 and 4 discuss potential draft press 
releases concerning financial disclosure, with 
actor 5 receiving overviews and sending them 
on to actor 6. At face value, these links pres-
ent nothing of real significance, as this sort of 
communication could be assumed to be a part 
of standard corporate operating procedure. 
It is only in the nature and content of these 
email communications that their importance 
becomes apparent. A significant portion of 
the email communications that were used in 
this aggregated data set later appear as being 
entered as exhibits used in evidence by the 
Department of Justice.
Figure	3.	Andrew	Fastow’s	Enron	email	network
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This section has demonstrated the relevance 
of the Triage stage within the framework by 
elucidating unstructured data, i.e., relationships 
and sizing nodes by prominence in the network, 
on a small sample of the available data. In this 
way, key potential sources of evidence and 
significant actors have been identified, whilst 
others, such as Skilling’s familial relation can be 
discounted. The next section will use relational 
analysis on these networks to further explore 
the unstructured data to provide evidence to 
the examiner.
Relational Analysis
This section details the analysis of the central-
ity measures to present a quantitative analysis 
of the email data as a centrality graph, which 
allows for qualitative interpretation. These 
circular radial graphs, created by exporting 
data from EET to SocNetV, are interpreted by 
observing the position of nodes (actors); the 
closer a node is to the centre of the graph, the 
higher the measure of that node by the centrality 
measure and therefore of greater interest within 
a digital investigation. Line thickness indicates 
the strength of the ties (relationships) with 
other nodes within the graph. Three centrality 
measures are used in this study to demonstrate 
the applicability of the approach to provide the 
digital examiner with different views of the 
email network; betweeness centrality, in-degree 
centrality and out-degree centrality.
Figure 4 illustrates the betweeness central-
ity of actors in the Jeffrey Skilling data set pre-
sented above. Given the source-centric nature 
of the data, it is to be expected that Skilling 
(actor A) would be placed at the centre of the 
graph. His PA Sheri Serra (actor B), would also 
appear more central than other actors given the 
nature of the actor’s relationship with Skilling.
Figure 5 illustrates the in-degree view of 
the Skilling network. Again, Skilling (actor A) 
is the central actor receiving a lot of informa-
tion from the network. An email alias of Skill-
ing (actor C) also appears in this graph and 
shows a higher level of in-degree centrality 
than many other actors. This could indicate a 
separate private store of emails which may be 
used for archival purposes or as a means of 
disseminating information from these discus-
sions outside of the Enron corporate structure. 
The next most prominent actor in this graph is 
Skilling’s PA (actor B). James Hughes (actor 
D) is another actor identified by using this 
measure of centrality. This actor’s position in 
the network displays a high level of access to 
information from across the network, highlight-
ing this actor as an information broker. This 
interpretation is borne out by documents from 
the Enron trial which show that this actor was 
a key member in enabling the flow of fraudu-
lent information around and beyond the Enron 
corporate network. Former CEO Kenneth Lay 
(actor E) is also highlighted using this measure. 
This actor’s position in the graph indicates only 
a marginal position of importance within Skill-
ing’s network for this data set.
Figure 6 displays a graph for out-degree 
centrality of the Skilling network. This graph 
shows the main actors from the in-degree cen-
trality graph retreating into the background of 
the network. As discussed, these actors received 
the most information from the network. Skill-
ing (actor A) and his PA (actor B) are still 
prominent in this graph as information recipients 
but this role is marginal at best. Instead a large 
number of other network actors come to the 
fore with none standing out as significant due 
to the sheer number of actors. An interesting 
feature of this graph is the number of connec-
tions between these actors and Skilling. Simi-
lar to the in-degree graph, Skilling has excep-
tional connectivity within the network.
These graphs help to interpret Skilling’s 
position as a key actor in the Enron network. 
The Triage stage suggests that this actor has a 
high degree of control over information flowing 
out of this network and being disseminated 
publicly. Furthermore, from the centrality 
measures, this actor shows up as key in both 
the receipt and dissemination of fraudulent 
documents within the Enron network. Evidence 
for this can be seen from his links with James 
Hughes and Kenneth Lay and subsequent 
documentary evidence (USDOJ, 2006). Both 
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Skilling and Lay are prominent in the data set, 
whilst Andrew Fastow’s presence is barely 
detectable despite documents from the time of 
the Enron collapse showing that he was one of 
the main actors in the Enron fraud.
Figure 7 illustrates the betweeness cen-
trality measurement of Andrew Fastow’s data 
set. From the graph, the financially related 
data involving Fastow (actor H) indicate that 
Kenneth Lay (actor E) is the most central actor. 
This was at the time when Enron’s financial 
situation was being called to account. Another 
actor of significance, Steve Kean (actor F), 
was Chief Financial Officer of Enron. The 
next actor of significance in this graph high-
lighted with a red circle (actor G) is Rosalee 
Fleming, Lay’s PA. A PA’s presence can be 
largely considered as an agent of the actor they 
represent. What is significant about this actor 
here, with importance to both the framework 
and the larger context of the case study, is that 
PAs tend to bridge the social networks of those 
they represent and will be potential sources of 
further evidence.
Skilling (actor A) is highlighted as a sig-
nificant actor within the network. He is dis-
played here with strong ties to Fastow who 
remains a peripheral figure in this graph, with 
little ability to influence the flow of information 
within the network. Also of significance is Ben 
Glisan (actor I), who was chief treasurer for 
Enron at the time of the collapse and who was 
found guilty of wire and securities fraud. His 
position in this data set displays his ability to 
influence and disseminate information around 
the network. Of equal significance to Skilling 
is Vanessa Groscrand (actor J). This actor is a 
member of the Enron advisory committee which 
provides some oversight of the financial trans-
actions undertaken by the company.
Figure	4.	Jeffrey	Skilling	betweeness	centrality
Figure	5.	Jeffrey	Skilling	in-degree	centrality
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The in-degree measurement of this data 
set in Figure 8 displays Jeffrey McMahon as 
possessing the highest in-degree centrality 
measure (actor K). McMahon was the former 
treasurer (superseded by Glisan) of Enron and 
responsible for brokering the early partnerships 
between Enron and Fastow’s three companies, 
which accounts for his position of prominence 
within this graph. McMahon was an unwilling 
participant in the fraudulent activities of other 
actors and was thus replaced with Glisan (actor 
I). This would account for Glisan’s position 
of prominence.
The actor possessing a next highest in-
degree centrality in this graph is Skilling 
(actor A). His position in the graph indicates 
that he is a central figure for communications 
directly involving Fastow and the financial 
dealings between Enron and the subsidiary 
companies. As in previous graphs, the PAs of 
Lay and Skilling appear as significant (actors 
L). Also, Fastow (actor H) appears to be of 
little significance. He possesses only one strong 
tie to another actor (Skilling) within the net-
work and receives all information updates 
from this source.
Figure 9 illustrates the out-degree central-
ity for actors within the data set. In this graph 
the PAs (actors L) for Lay and Skilling are the 
most prominent. This is an indicator of how 
much information they send into the network 
on behalf of their respective superiors. The 
next actor of significance is Ken Rice (actor 
M) and it is the first time his presence is seen in 
all of the centrality measurements thus far. As 
the head of the Enron broadband division, he 
was indicted on 37 counts of fraudulent activi-
ties. Email topics within this dataset included 
financial “overviews” of the position of Enron 
broadband within the market, which was later 
reported as code for fraudulent disclosure of 
financial information.
The next actor of significance is Steve 
Kean (actor F) who was a senior vice president 
of Enron in charge of public affairs and also 
a member of the Enron advisory council. His 
presence in this position indicates that he is a 
prime sender of information with the ability 
to monitor much of the information that flowed 
across this network (as indicated by a position 
of prominence in the betweeness graph, see 
Figure 7). Another actor of prominence is Sheri 
Serra (actor B), Skilling’s PA, during the time 
period of this data set. Of equal out-degree 
centrality in this graph are Skilling (actor A) 
and Vanessa Groscrand (actor J). The increased 
prominence of members of the Enron executive 
oversight committee, such as Groscrand, is of 
special significance in these graphs. This in-
crease indicates that the oversight committee 
was clearly beginning to take a more proactive 
approach to overseeing the actions and finan-
cial transactions of some of the key members 
of the network.
When combined with supporting evi-
dence, the quantitative analysis of this social 
Figure	6.	Jeffrey	Skilling	out-degree	centrality
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network provides some indicative and inter-
esting conclusions. The executive oversight 
committee of Enron took a stronger stance on 
the financial dealings of the company and its 
strategic partnership companies. The previous 
financial controller, Jeffrey McMahon, was an 
unwilling participant in fraudulent activities. 
His replacement, Ben Glisan, was promoted 
and co-opted on the basis of tractability and 
willingness to commit fraudulent acts. Glisan 
became a prominent actor within the manage-
ment reporting structure of the network. This 
position allowed the doctoring of informa-
tion that flowed around the network so as to 
benefit the prominent actors. Andrew Fastow, 
the architect of the strategic partnership fraud 
methodology, is seen in these graphs but with 
a low profile. The information they received 
from the network appears to come from two 
more prominent sources – Kenneth Lay and 
Jeffrey Skilling – indicating strong ties to these 
actors. These actors and relational information 
are identified by applying the framework posited 
in this paper.
CONCLUSION
Our reliance on digital communications, of 
which email is a subset, ensures that this type 
of data will remain prominent in a digital 
forensics investigation. Emails comprise both 
Figure	7.	Andrew	Fastow	betweeness	centrality
Figure	8.	Andrew	Fastow	in-degree	centrality
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structured and unstructured data. Structured data 
provides qualitative information to the forensics 
examiner and is typically viewed through tools 
such as EnCase and FTK. Unstructured data 
is more complex as it comprises information 
about a social network, such as relationships, 
identification of key actors and power relations, 
and there are currently no standardised tools for 
its forensic analysis. In addition, visualisation 
of this data can greatly aid the examiner in their 
understanding of the evidence.
This paper presents a framework for the 
analysis of unstructured (and structured) data 
and applies it to a case study to demonstrate 
its applicability. Link analysis visualisation 
provides a rudimentary analysis of the email 
data and can be used to effectively triage the 
potentially large data sets to identify key actors 
(and discount others) within the network. This 
can then be used to inform the deeper analysis of 
unstructured data, whereby relevant actors may 
be assessed. The application of social network 
analysis tools and techniques to measure the 
network not only provide different viewpoints 
of the network, but also quantifies an actor’s 
role, and therefore potentially their culpability, 
in an event or set of events. The results obtained 
from applying the framework to the Enron data 
concur with those established during the FERC 
investigation, suggesting that the techniques 
used in this analysis provide a valid indication 
of real world activity. Moreover, the case study 
suggests that significant results can be gained by 
aggregating key actor data into a single data set, 
given the source-centric nature of email data. 
This aggregation provides the additional benefit 
of enabling the investigator to recreate the role 
of actors, such as Andrew Fastow, whose data 
may have been excised or obfuscated.
Further work aims to develop the frame-
work and appropriate tools for digital investiga-
tions. For example, there is a temporal element 
to unstructured data that would further enhance 
the understanding of social network information 
by identifying key nodes of influence and the 
development of the network over time. In addi-
tion, work aims to incorporate network narrative 
analysis tools. In this way, the investigator may 
visualise not only the network relationships, 
but the structured data’s influence on network 
behaviour.
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